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Abstract—Recently, code reuse attacks (CRAs), such as return-
oriented programming (ROP) and jump-oriented programming
(JOP), have emerged as a new class of ingenious security threats.
Attackers can utilize CRAs to hijack the control flow of programs
to perform malicious actions without injecting any codes. Many
defenses, classed into software-based and hardware-based, have
been proposed. However, software-based methods are difficult
to be deployed in practical systems due to high performance
overhead. Hardware-based methods can reduce performance
overhead but may require extending instruction set architectures
(ISAs) and modifying the compiler or suffer the vulnerability of
key leakage. To tackle these issues, this paper proposes a new
hardware-assisted control flow checking method to resist CRAs
with negligible performance overhead without extending ISAs,
modifying the compiler or leaking the encryption/decryption
key. The key technique involves two control flow checking
mechanisms. The first one is the encrypted Hamming distances
(EHDs) matching between the physical unclonable function (PUF)
response and the return addresses, which prevents attackers
from returning between gadgets so long as the PUF response
is secret, thus resisting ROP attacks. The second one is the
linear encryption/decryption operation (XOR) between the PUF
response and the instructions at target addresses of call and
jmp instructions to defeat JOP attacks. Advanced return-based
full-function reuse attacks will be prevented with the dynamic
key-updating method. Experimental evaluations on benchmarks
demonstrate that the proposed method introduces negligible
0.95% runtime overhead and 0.78% binary size overhead on
average.
Index Terms—control flow integrity, code reuse attacks, phys-
ical unclonable function, hardware-assisted security.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
CODE reuse attacks (CRAs) emerged as a powerful attack,can hijack the control flow of programs without injecting
any malicious codes. CRAs can use the original code in the
program to construct small fragments of existing codes. These
code fragments are called gadgets. A gadget is composed
of several assembly instructions, and each instruction can
implement a different function (e.g., write a specified value
to a fixed register). By chaining the gadgets ingeniously, an
attacker can construct a sequence of gadgets to implement
the same function as the malicious code. After constructing
gadgets, attackers utilize the buffer overflow vulnerability to
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overwrite the return address on the stack with the start address
of gadget chaining to hijack the control flow of the program,
and ultimately obtain the system privilege. CRAs mainly
include return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks [1], [2]
and jump-oriented programming (JOP) attacks [3], [4]. ROP
was shown to be Turing-complete on a variety of platforms.
It allows attackers to execute arbitrary codes by performing
a chain of gadgets which come from existing binaries and
all end with a ret instruction, while JOP makes use of jmp
instructions instead of ret instructions in gadgets to change
the control flow. Some tools [5] have been developed to find
useful gadgets in given binaries to facilitate CRAs which
have been demonstrated on a broad range of architectures,
such as x86, Atmel AVR, SPARC, ARM, Z80 and PowerPC,
and successfully cracked some well-known software such
as Adobe Reader, Adobe Flashplayer and Quicktime Player.
To thwart the CRAs, many defenses have been proposed in
industry and academia. However, they suffer from several
issues. Below we will summarize these techniques and analyze
the limitations of them.
B. Limitations of Prior Art
Buffer overflow is one of the most prevalent software
attacks. Stack smashing [6] is a typical buffer overflow attack
that attackers inject the malicious code in the stack and
overwrite the return address of the normal instruction to
execute the malicious code. Several approaches have been
proposed to defeat buffer overflow attacks. For example, data
execution prevention (DEP) [7] prohibits a memory page
from being writable and executable at the same time. Hence,
attackers are unable to execute their injected malicious codes.
DEP has been supported by both AMD and Intel processors
and widely adopted by modern operating systems. However,
CRAs are able to redirect the control flow of programs via
reusing gadgets, thus eliminating the need of code injection
and bypassing hardware memory protection mechanisms such
as DEP.
Recently, a lot of defenses have been proposed to defend
against CRAs. The most general solution is the control-flow
integrity (CFI) checking, where the control flow graph (CFG)
of the program is generated during compilation and enforced
at runtime [8]. CFI can be roughly classed into two categories,
software-based and hardware-based. Current software-based
solutions incur significant performance overhead [8]–[10],
[12], which limits adoption in practical systems. Hardware-
based CFIs can reduce performance overhead and have at-
tracted much attention in recent years. But hardware-based
ar
X
iv
:1
80
1.
07
39
7v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
9 S
ep
 20
18
IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, 2018. 2
CFIs require extending the instruction set architectures (ISAs)
of processors and modifying the compiler [11], [13]–[17], or
suffer the vulnerability of leaking encryption/decryption key
[18].
C. Our Contributions
This paper proposes a Hardware-assisted Control-flow In-
tegrity Checking technique, named HCIC, to thwart CRAs
by encrypted Hamming distance (EHD)-matching and linear
encryption/decryption without modifying compiler, extending
ISAs or leaking encryption/decryption key. HCIC provides
the following capabilities against ROP/JOP style control-flow
anomaly attacks.
EHD matching method: the EHDs between return ad-
dresses of call-function and the physical unclonable function
(PUF) [19] response are computed before the return addresses
are stored in the memory structure. Then, the EHDs will be
computed at runtime when the ret instructions are executed.
Finally, the pre-computed EHDs are compared with the EHDs
computed at runtime to verify whether the EHDs are matched.
If an attacker modifies the return address in the stack, the
EHDs will not be matched. In this case, our proposed mecha-
nism can prevent the attacker from returning between gadgets
to thwart ROP attacks. With the PUF response (key) updating,
return-based full-function reuse attacks can be prevented.
Linear encryption/decryption method: the PUF-based
linear encryption operations (XOR) on the instructions at
target addresses of jmp and call are performed once the exe-
cutable binary is loaded into memory. Then, the runtime linear
decryption operation can be done while jmp or call instructions
are executed. If an attacker modifies the destination address
of a jmp or call instruction, the default decryption operation
for the instruction at the address will be enforced, which will
cause the control flow to be abnormal and eventually may
result in a system error, thus defeating JOP attacks.
Compared with previous solutions, our solution incurs ex-
tremely low performance and binary size (memory) overheads.
This approach has the following contributions and features:
1) EHD matching method is proposed to protect programs
from ROP attacks. This new method solves the security
vulnerability suffered in the previous work [18] that the
secret PUF key can be deduced through memory leakage
or debugging.
2) linear encryption/decryption mechanism is proposed to
resist JOP attacks. In this mechanism, the PUF key used
in the JOP-defense mechanism is different from the PUF
key used in the ROP-defense mechanism, which brings
a big advantage that the key leakage in JOP-defense
mechanism cannot be used to compromise the ROP-
defense mechanism. Therefore, the security is improved.
3) Dynamic key-updating method is proposed to resist ad-
vanced CRAs and hence improves the security. Moreover,
HCIC does not require the PUF to generate the reliable
response and hence avoiding the intractable reliability
issue suffered in previous PUF applications [20], [21],
[23].
4) HCIC does not modify the compiler or add any new
instructions to the existing processor’s ISA.
5) Simulation results demonstrate that our architecture’s
average runtime and binary size overheads are only 0.95%
and 0.78%, respectively, which are much lower than
traditional CFI approaches (up to 21% [8]).
6) Exception analysis shows that our proposed defense does
not produce anomalies when some exceptional cases
occurred, and security analysis shows that the proposed
method is sound and secure against CRAs with zero false
positive and negative rates.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work
is elaborated in Section II. Code reuse attacks are described
in Section III. Preliminaries are given in Section IV. The
proposed hardware-assisted CFI and its working mechanism
and exception analysis are elaborated in Section V. Security is
analyzed in Section VI. The detailed experimental results and
analysis are reported in Section VII. Finally, we conclude in
Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
CRAs use existing codes to launch an attack without in-
jecting any codes. A kind of early code reuse attack, named
return-to-libc attack [24], can call the libc functions elaborately
chosen by the attackers to change the normal control flow.
In this way, an attacker might eventually execute malicious
computing. Recently, ROP [1], [2] and JOP [3], [4] as more
powerful types of code reuse attacks are proposed. A lot
of works have been proposed to defend against CRAs, such
as address space layout randomization (ASLR) [25]–[27],
shadow stack [28]–[30], gadgets checking [32] and CFI [13]–
[16], [33].
ASLR [25]–[27] is to randomize addresses of code and
data regions to prevent the attacker from getting the entry
address of gadgets when the program is loaded into memory.
However, the data and code region are not fully randomized,
and with the knowledge of some randomized codes, it is still
possible for attackers to find enough gadgets in memory to
perform CRAs [2]. Shadow stack was proposed to protect the
return addresses in the stack from being tampered by adding
a second stack that is dedicated to control transfer operations.
However, shadow stack is vulnerable to JOP attacks [28],
[29], and requires the specialized maintenance which brings
additional overhead, and even requires modifying the ISA
[30]. Gadgets checking [32] judges whether the program is
attacked by monitoring the frequency of executing gadgets.
This method can defend against JOP attacks. However, when a
program consists of many small functions having little amount
of instructions, it may incur a high false positive rate. Among
current defenses, CFI is the most general solution whose key
idea is to generate the CFG for a program during compilation
and enforce the control flow to follow the CFG at runtime.
CFI includes software-based CFI and hardware-based CFI as
we will introduce in details next.
A. Software-based CFI
CFI checking makes the control flow change be consistent
with the CFG of original program. Abadi et al. proposed
to check the CFI [8] by inserting the checking ID before
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each indirect branch instruction to prevent the unintended
change of control flow. Any illegal change of control flow
will be theoretically checked and rejected at runtime due
to an ID-checking violation. In theory, each control flow
transition can be inserted with a unique ID. However, these
CFIs incur high performance overhead due to the ID creating,
storing, querying and comparing. The performance overhead
of CFI is up to 21% [8]. In order to reduce the performance
overhead, several techniques [9] have been proposed to loosen
the control transitions and use fewer IDs. Compact control
flow integrity and randomization (CCFIR) [9] redirects indirect
jmp branches to a new springboard. Indirect jmp instructions
are checked and only allowed to transit control flow to the
springboard entries by assigning aligned entry to direct and
indirect branch targets. CCFIR uses three IDs to restrict control
flow transitions. Two IDs are used to return to sensitive or
insensitive functions, and one ID is used for call or indirect
jmp instructions. This looser CFI allows the control flow to
transfer to an address that does not exist in the CFG, which
makes it be possible for attackers to launch an advanced ROP
attack. Besides, CCFIR requires program allocating aligned
springboard to ensure control flow integrity, which largely
increases the space requirements.
As discussed above, software-based CFIs incur high per-
formance and binary size overheads, and require the insertion
of checking instructions or the creation of accompanying data
structures such as a stack during the execution of program,
which may overwrite registers or flags at runtime and cause
programs behaving abnormally [8].
B. Hardware-Based CFI
Hardware-based CFIs can reduce performance overhead
and hence have attracted much attention recently. Several
hardware-based CFIs have been proposed, such as Branch
Regulation (BR) [10] and hardware-assisted CFI [13]–[16].
BR [10] uses hardware support to monitor the control flow,
in which the indirect jmp instruction is restricted to jump to
its own function or the first instruction of other functions.
BR also adds a shadow stack to record legal return addresses
and check the return addresses before the functions return. To
improve efficiency, BR uses cache to access the shadow stack.
BR adds BR-annotation to indicate a function and restrict
indirect branch. However, BR allows the jmp instruction to
transfer the control flow inside the function, which can be
used by an attacker to perform malicious attacks. Kanuparthi
et al. [34] proposed to use the dynamic trusted platform
module (DTPM) to support runtime integrity checking of a
program. The key idea is to verify the hash value of each
trace in CFG to check the integrity of control flow. However,
DTPM incurs high performance overhead and cannot detect
the control flow anomalies between basic blocks (BBs). Davi
et al. [13], [14] proposed a hardware-assisted fine-grained
CFI which adds new CPU instructions to ISAs. It assigns
a different label to each function to ensure that an indirect
call instruction must comply with new CPU instructions.
Since the label for a call function is activated at call time
and will be checked at return time, ret instructions can only
return to the most recent callsite. However, the recognition of
labels requires modifying the compiler and extending ISAs.
Besides, runtime checking requires a label state memory to
store function labels, which increases the space overhead. In
2016, Sullivan et al. [15] enhanced the hardware-assisted fine-
grained CFI to ensure the forward-edge and backward-edge
control flows follow the CFG. Such defense can prevent ROP,
JOP, and full-function reuse. But it also requires extending
ISAs and modifying the compiler and code size overhead is up
to 13.5%. In our previous hardware-assisted CFI architecture
[18], the return addresses of function-call are encrypted and
will be decrypted with the simple XOR operation when the
corresponding instructions are executed, which is vulnerable
to the debugging attack because the linearly encrypted ad-
dresses can be got through memory leakage or debugging and
hence secret PUF response can be deduced. Later, the authors
[17] proposed to replace XOR with the AES integrated in
Intel processors to improve security, but this technique also
needs to expand the ISA (added new AES encryption and
decryption instructions) [35]. Cryptographic CFI (CCFI) [36]
also protects control flow elements with AES. However, CCFI
is built on source codes and has limitations in performance
overhead and defending against JOP attacks. Clercq et al.
[37] use cryptographic mechanisms to encrypt and decrypt
the instructions with control flow dependent information to
enforce CFI, which does not need to extend ISAs. However, it
incurs unacceptable performance overhead (up to 110%), and
when the same function is called multiple times, the instruction
decryption will be wrong which would incur high false positive
rate.
To address these issues, this paper proposes a hardware-
assisted CFI checking with the encrypted Hamming distance
(EHD)-matching and linear encryption/decryption without
modifying the compiler, extending ISAs and the vulnerability
of leaking encryption/decryption key. Our proposed method in-
curs low performance overhead and does not produce anoma-
lies when some exceptional cases occurred. Security analysis
shows that the proposed method is sound and secure against
ROP and JOP and even some advanced CRAs such as return-
based full-function reuse attacks.
III. CODE REUSE ATTACKS
When executing a call function, CPU pushes the return
address into the stack and then performs the instruction at
the first address of the destination function. When the ret
instruction is executed, the CPU pops the return address from
the stack and executes the instruction at the return address.
ROP attacks first construct a sequence of gadgets from the
existing code, then link the entry addresses of these gadgets
together to form a chain. Finally, an attacker exploits the buffer
overflow vulnerability to overwrite the return address on the
stack with the entry address of the gadgets chain. Once CPU
executes the ret instruction, the program would execute the
gadgets chain and completes the ROP attack. The principle
of JOP is similar to ROP. The difference is that JOP uses
indirect jmp instructions to hijack the program’s control flow
and execute malicious actions. In what follows, we will discuss
ROP and JOP in detail.
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pop ecx
ret
?
mov eax, ecx
ret
?
mov ebx, ecx
?
int 0x80
ret
memory
Parameter 1
Address of 
gadget 2
Address of 
gadget 1
Parameter 2
Address of 
gadget 3
Address of 
?int 0x80?
stack
23
4
5
gadget 1
gadget 2
gadget 3
System call
1
Overwrite
Fig. 1. An example of ROP attack.
A. ROP attacks
Stack is used to store temporary variables, the return address
and parameters of the function call and so on, which will be
pushed into the stack successively when CPU executes the call
instruction. When the ret instruction is executed, the return
address will be popped into the program counter and CPU
will execute the instruction at the return address. If an attacker
overwrites the return address, the instruction at the overwritten
address would be executed, and the control flow will be
hijacked by the attacker. ROP utilizes the characteristics of the
stack for call function to hijack the control flow of programs
by overwriting the return address in the stack. Gadgets are
the object program’s small code fragments, so the ROP attack
is covert and difficult to be found. Such attack can bypass
existing defense mechanisms such as DEP [7].
We illustrate an ROP attack in Fig. 1, where the goal of the
attacker is to make a system call “int 0x80” with the parameter
“data” in both eax and ebx registers. To achieve this goal, the
attacker needs to complete the following steps.
Step 1: The attacker exploits an overflow vulnerability to
tamper the return address with the addresses of the system call
“int 0x80”, gadget 1, gadget 2, gadget 3 and the data that the
system call needs in the stack.
Step 2: The program executes the gadget 1. The “pop ecx”
instruction stores the parameter 1 which is designated by the
attacker in ecx register. Then, the program gets the address
of gadget 2 from the stack and jumps to the gadget 2 after
executing the ret instruction.
Step 3: The program executes the gadget 2. The “mov eax,
ecx” instruction moves the parameter 1 in the ecx to the eax.
Then, the program gets the address of gadget 1 from the stack
and jumps to the gadget 1 after executing the ret instruction.
Step 4: The program executes the gadget 1 again. The “pop
ecx” instruction stores the parameter 2 which is designated by
the attacker in the ecx register. Then, the program gets the
address of gadget 3 from the stack and jumps to the gadget 3
after executing the ret instruction.
Step 5: The program executes the gadget 3. The “mov
ebx, ecx” instruction moves the parameter 2 in the ecx to
the ebx. Then, the program gets the address of “int 0x80”
from the stack and jumps to “int 0x80” after executing the ret
instruction.
When constructing the entry address chain of gadgets, we
add the same number of data as the number of pop instructions
after adding the entry address of gadgets. This ensures that
when the ret instruction is executed, the program pops the
return address which is the entry address of the next gadget
and continues to execute the rest of gadgets to complete the
attack.
B. JOP attacks
The JOP attack is similar to the ROP attack. It also utilizes
the existing code in the program to hijack the program
control flow. The difference is that JOP attacks use indirect
jmp instructions to change the control flow of the program
while the ROP attacks use ret instructions. During program
execution, an attacker can change the values in registers with
specified parameters. When program executes the indirect jmp
instruction or indirect call instruction, the target address taken
from the register is the address that the attacker constructed.
The attacker forces the program to execute these gadgets to
complete the JOP attack. Because JOP uses indirect jmp/call
instructions instead of ret instructions, which makes current
ROP defenses unable to prevent JOP attacks. Therefore, ROP
and JOP should be prevented simultaneously for any effective
defenses.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
The general terms and concepts used throughout the paper
will be introduced as follows.
A. Silicon Physical Unclonable Functions
Silicon Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) has emerged
as a promising hardware security primitive that is used for
authentication and key generation without the requirement of
expensive hardware such as secure EEPROMs and battery-
backed SRAM, and hence gained a lot of attention over the
past few years [19] [38].
There are several reasons that we use PUF instead of
traditional secret key storing in digital memory to assist CFI
verification. First, PUFs derive a secret from the physical
characteristics of the IC. This approach is advantageous over
standard secure digital storage such as more easy to fabricate,
consuming less power and area, and naturally anti-tamper [38].
Second, the PUF key is chip-unique, unclonable and can be
updated each time when the program is loaded. Even if a PUF
key is cracked in a system, it cannot be used to break another
system, and hence improves the security largely. Third, it is
well known that current PUF applications such as key gen-
eration [39], two-factor authentication [40], anti-overbuilding
[20], FPGA IP protection [21], [22] and resisting FPGA replay
attacks [23] cannot tolerate bit errors (e.g., key generation
has an extremely high requirement on reliability). They all
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.
.
call func_2
ID11:
.
.
.
call func_3
ID12:
.
.
.
check ID41
call *(fptr)
ID21:
.
.
.
check ID11
ret
check ID41
call *(fptr)
ID31:
.
.
.
check ID12
ret
ID41:
.
.
.
check ID21||ID31
ret
func_1 () :
func_3 () :
bool func_1 ( int a ){
    return a < 0;
}
func_2 ( int x) {
    func_1 ( x );
}
func_3 ( int y) {
    func_1 ( y );
}
cal ( int a, int b) {
    func_2 (a);
    func_3 (b);
}
Fig. 2. An example of program fragments and a fine-grained CFI.
require extra reliability-enhancing techniques [41] and error-
correction schemes [42] to increase the quality of responses,
which incurs significant hardware overhead and hence limits
adoption. Our proposed HCIC exhibits a big advantage that
it does not require the PUF to generate the reliable response
and hence avoiding such intractable issue suffered in previous
applications. Last, many intrinsic PUFs [43], [44] have been
proposed. They require no additional circuitry (zero hardware
overhead), and is cost effective. Random number generator
also can be used, but it incus higher hardware overhead and
lower security than PUF.
B. Control Flow Integrity
Before running the program, the control flow integrity
(CFI) mechanism calculates the normal execution paths of the
program. CFI employs the debug information to generate the
complete CFG before the program is compiled, and forces
the program to execute in accordance with the normal control
flow. To ensure CFI, the CFG needs to be extracted from the
program first. A basic block (BB) is an instruction sequence
that only has a single entry point and a single exit point.
A function consists of multiple BBs. A CFG represents the
correct run direction of program between BBs.
As shown in Fig. 2, the fine-grained CFI [45] assigns a
unique ID at the target address of control flow instructions
and inserts the ID checking instructions before the control
flow instructions in order to ensure that the target addresses
of the control flow instructions are valid. There are two types
of control flow jump instructions, direct jump and indirect
jump. The target address of the direct jump is fixed and cannot
be tampered, so the ID does not need to be inserted and
checked when the program is running. While for indirect jump
instructions, their target addresses are calculated and loaded
into the memory when the program is running and hence can
be tampered. The CFI is for indirect jump instructions. Before
the program executes the indirect jump instruction, it is first to
check that whether the ID at the target address is equal to the
known and valid ID of the jump instruction. With this way,
the legitimacy of indirect jump is verified. However, the fine-
grained CFI inserts a unique ID at the target address of indirect
jump. If the instruction can jump to multiple target addresses,
all these IDs will be compared to determine whether the jump
is legal. This incurs high performance overhead.
.
.
.
call func_2
ID2:
.
.
.
call func_3
ID2:
.
.
.
check ID1
call *(fptr)
ID2:
.
.
.
check ID2
ret
check ID1
call *(fptr)
ID2:
.
.
.
check ID2
ret
ID1:
.
.
.
check ID2
ret
cal() : func_2 () :
func_1 () :
func_3 () :
bool func_1 ( int a ){
    return a < 0?;
}
func_2 ( int x) {
    func_1 ( x );
}
func_3 ( int y) {
    func_1 ( y );
}
cal ( int a, int b) {
    func_2 (a);
    func_3 (b);
}
Fig. 3. An example of program fragments and a coarse-grained CFI.
Fig. 3 shows an example of a coarse-grained CFI with fewer
IDs to reduce the performance overhead, much like CCFIR
[9] and Bin-CFI [12]. In this example, there are two kinds of
control flow transitions. The first one is the function pointer
fptr pointing to function func 1() (in function func 2() and
func 3()), and the other is the function return of func 2(),
func 3(), cal(), or func 1(). In order to prevent ROP and
JOP attacks from tampering the destination address of fptr,
CFI adds the ID1 checking (check ID1) for verifying legal
jumps from the source (function func 2() and func 3()) to the
destinations of fptr (functions func 1()). Any illegal jumps to
other destinations will not pass the check ID1 because there
are no ID1 inserted at those destination addresses. Meanwhile,
CFI also adds the ID2 checking (check ID2) for verifying
legal returns from the call functions to the callsite to avoid
malicious modifications on the return addresses in the stack.
Any changes to other return addresses will not pass the check
ID2 because there are no ID2 inserted at illegal addresses.
This CFI introduces fewer IDs (for instance, the Bin-CFI
mechanism introduces two IDs). Therefore, it introduces lower
verification overhead than the ideal CFI. However, as the
gadgets with the same ID increases, the attack would be
success with higher probability. For example, the jump from
func 1 to func 3 (red) shown in Fig. 3 is illegal but cannot be
detected with this CFI. Recently, several coarse-grained CFI
methods have been proposed in academia and industry. For
example, Intel proposed an indirect branch tracking method
that adds a new instruction ENDBRANCH to mark valid
indirect call/jmp targets in the program to defend against JOP
[30]; BBB-CFI [31] proposed to limit the indirect call/jmp to
target at the starting address of a BB by code-inspired BB
boundary and data-inspired BB boundary to defend against
JOP. These coarse-grained methods allow the indirect call/jmp
to target at the starting address of any BBs and hence cannot
check the unintended branches between BBs.
As described above, fine-grained CFI and coarse-grained
CFI have their own strengths and weaknesses. The fine-
grained CFI has higher security, while the coarse-grained CFI
incurs lower performance overhead. Therefore, the security
and practicality should be balanced. Our proposed method
in this paper shows a good balance between security and
practicality compared with previous CFI methods because
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Program
PUFE
Memory
Instruction Cache High Performance 
CPU Pipeline
profile
load
Judger
EHDME EHDMD PUFD
call ret jmp
Hardware-assisted  CFI Module
Non-Control Flow 
Instruction
Conventional 
Processor
Fig. 4. Basic framework of HCIC
HCIC incurs low performance overhead and is able to resist
mainstream CRAs.
V. THE PROPOSED HARDWARE-ASSISTED CFI
In this study, we assume that the program code is trust-
worthy and the attacker cannot modify the source code of
the program that has been loaded into memory. In addition,
we assume that the attacked system has deployed DEP which
forces the attacker to reuse existing code. We further assume
that the attacker can access the stack to perform overflow
attacks and CRAs. The details of the proposed hardware-
assisted CFI checking are depicted in figures 4, 5 and 6 and
described as follows.
A. Encrypted Hamming Distance
Hamming distance (HD) is a number used to denote the
difference between two binary strings. Let x and y be two
binary sequences of the same length. The HD d(x, y) between
x and y is the number of positions at which the corresponding
symbols are different:
d(x, y) =
n−1∑
i=0
x[i]
⊕
y[i] (1)
where i = 0, 1, ..., n-1; x, y denotes n-bit binary sequence; ⊕
denotes exclusive OR.
One of key contributions in this paper is that the encrypted
Hamming distance (EHD) matching method is proposed to
resist ROP. The EHD is generated by appending random l
bits at the end of d(x, y) and then rotating right m bits. In this
paper, m can be the last k-bit in the PUF key (ranges from 0
to 2k−1); l can be the first l-bit in the PUF key (l = 2k−6).
Since the address is 32 bits, the HD ranges from 0 to 32, and
requires 6 bits to encode.
For example, assume that the secret PUF key key 2 is
0x12345678 (0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111 1000),
HD = 20 (010100), k = 5, and l = 26. First, we append the first
26 bits of key 2 (0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 01) to the
end of the HD, and then rotate the new 32-bit HD (0101 0000
0100 1000 1101 0001 0101 1001) right m bits. The value of
m is determined by the last 5 bits of key 2 (11000), so m =
24. Finally, the 32-bit HD is rotated right 24 bits to generate
the EHD 0x48D15950 (0100 1000 1101 0001 0101 1001 0101
0000).
Program
PUF Generates 
keys
Encrypt the 
instructions
Program is 
loaded into 
memory
Program 
executes
Call instruction?
Ret instruction?
jmp instruction?
Compute the EHD 
and push it in the 
stack
Compute the EHD 
and compare with 
pre-stored EHD
Same?
Decrypt the 
instruction
The instruction 
execute normally?
Program exits 
abnormally
Y
N
Y
N
YN
Y NN Y
Fig. 5. The flow of HCIC
B. Framework of HCIC
The framework of hardware-assisted CFI checking is shown
in Fig. 4. Judger is to determine whether the instruction
is the control flow instruction. If the fetched instruction is
the control flow instruction, the next instruction would be
processed by the hardware-assisted CFI Module, while non-
control flow instruction is fed to the conventional processor.
There are four key operations, EHD matching-based encoding
(EHDME), EHD matching-based decoding (EHDMD), PUF-
based encoding (PUFE) and PUF-based decoding (PUFD),
involving in our proposed HCIC. EHDME and EHDMD are
used to encode and verify the EHDs to resist ROP attacks.
PUFE and PUFD are used to resist JOP attacks. The whole
flow of HCIC is shown in Fig. 5.
A ret instruction will bring the program execution to an
address which is pushed into the stack by a call instruction.
But an attacker is able to modify the address by overflow
attacks. We should guarantee the ret instruction targeting the
next instruction of the corresponding call instruction. The jmp
instructions and call instructions also should be limited to
point to the encrypted instructions which belong to the first
instructions of BBs. We elaborate it as follows.
CALL and RET: To prevent attackers from changing the
return address of a ret instruction via the memory overflow and
then hijacking the control flow of a program, EHDME would
first compute the encrypted Hamming distance EHD1 between
the key 2 generated by PUF and the return address when the
call instruction is executed. Then, the return address and EHD1
are pushed into the stack. When the ret instruction is executed,
EHDMD would compute the encrypted Hamming distance
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Fig. 6. Micro-architecture and data flow of HCIC. 1© key 1 is used to
linearly encrypt the first instruction at target address of jmp and call via
XOR operation. 2© Perform XOR operation on the return address of the call
instruction with key 2 or the first instruction at target address of the jmp
instruction and the call instruction with key 1. 3© key 1 is used to linearly
decrypt the first instruction at target address of the jmp and call instruction
via XOR operation. 4© Calculate the encrypted Hamming distance EHD1
between the return address and key 2. 5©When a call instruction is executed,
EHD1 is pushed into the stack as a parameter. 6© When a ret instruction is
executed, the encrypted Hamming distance EHD2 between key 2 and the
current popped return address is calculated and transmitted into the decision
circuit (DC) which judges whether EHD2 is equal to the pre-stored EHD1.
EHD2 between key 2 and the current popped return address
again. Only the EHD2 is equal to the pre-stored encrypted
Hamming distance EHD1, can the program jump normally.
Once the return address was overflowed at runtime or there is
no paired call for ret instructions, the EHD2 would be unequal
to EHD1 because the PUF key is unknown to the attacker.
Hence, the execution cannot point to the code that attackers
intend to perform.
CALL and JMP: We use the XOR operation to linearly
encrypt/decrypt the first instruction at destination address of
the jmp and call in order to prevent attackers from hijacking
the control flow of a program. Before the program is loaded
into memory, the key 1 generated by PUF is used to encrypt
all first instructions at target addresses (PUFE). When the
program is running, as long as the jmp or call instruction is
executed, the first instruction will be decrypted dynamically
with key 1 (PUFD). Thus, if attackers hijack the control flow
via illegally changing the target address of the jmp and call,
the program may jump to an address with an unencrypted
instruction which would be decrypted forcedly. If an incorrect
decrypted instruction is executed, a system error may occur.
Thus, JOP attacks would be defeated if an attacker wants to
use indirect branch instructions to perform code reuse attacks.
Fig. 6 depicts the hardware structure of our proposed
mechanism, as shown in the purple area, and how it in-
teracts with CPU. The hardware structure is appended to
CPU architecture with a XOR operation unit, 4 registers
(KEY 1,KEY 2,KEY LEN 1,KEY LEN 2), a PUF
module, an encrypted Hamming distance calculation circuit
(EHDCC) and a decision circuit (DC). CPU communicates
with the XOR unit; the PUF communicates with the registers;
the registers communicate with the XOR unit. The XOR
unit communicates with EHDCC; the EHDCC communicates
with the DC. key 1 and key 2 used in XOR operation are
generated by the PUF module and stored in KEY 1 and
KEY 2 registers. The reason we use two keys is to solve the
security vulnerability that the work [18] suffered. It is well-
known that if the program has been loaded into memory, the
code can not be tampered anymore. Hence, JOP attacks are
unable to break the defense. However, through JOP attacks, the
attacker can deduce the secret key used for linear encryption
by memory leakage or debugging. If the defense mechanism
exploits a single secret key in all XOR operations, attackers
can calculate correct EHDs of every address for ROP attacks.
To eliminate the vulnerability, we exploit two different secret
keys for the encryption/decryption operation. The key length
of key 1 and key 2 is determined by the KEY LEN 1 and
KEY LEN 2 registers. Here the length of key 1 is x which
is less than the length of the shortest first instruction, and
the length of key 2 is 32 bits. The values of KEY LEN 1
and KEY LEN 2 registers are x and 32, respectively. After
receiving the XOR result, the encrypted Hamming distance of
current return address is calculated in EHDCC and then is sent
to DC. The DC will judge whether the calculated encrypted
Hamming distance is equal to the previously stored one.
In our proposed HCIC, the first step is to perform XOR
operation on all first instructions at target addresses of call
and jmp instructions for linear encryption before the program
is loaded into memory. Next, when the jmp instruction is ex-
ecuted, the first instruction at target address will be decrypted
dynamically. When the call instruction is executed, XOR and
EHDCC will be used to calculate the encrypted Hamming
distance between the return address and key 2 and store it
in stack, and then the first instruction at target address is
decrypted and executed. When the ret instruction is executed,
the XOR and EHDCC will be used to calculate the encrypted
Hamming distance between return address and key 2, and
then the DC judges whether the program control flow is normal
by comparing the calculated EHD and the previously stored
one.
The concrete process of HCIC is as follows:
1) When the program is started up, CPU calls the silicon-
PUF module to generate key 1 and key 2 and stores
them in KEY 1 and KEY 2 registers, respectively. Ac-
cording to the rule proposed above, the lengths of key 1
and key 2 are generated and stored in KEY LEN 1
and KEY LEN 2, respectively.
2) Before loading the program into memory, CPU searches
target addresses of all call and jmp instructions and
transmits every first instruction to XOR.
3) XOR unit performs XOR operation on every first instruc-
tion for linear encryption unit according to key length 1
and key 1 and returns the result to CPU.
4) After all the first instructions are encrypted, the program
is loaded into memory and starts up.
5) In the executing process, memory transmits the program
instruction to Cache in real time. CPU will fetch the
instruction from Cache and then decrypt it. When the
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0x08048546:       call   80484f3 <func>
0x0804854b:       add    $0x10, %esp
                                   .
                                   . 
0x080484f3:        push   %ebp
0x080484f4:         mov    %esp, %ebp
0x080484f6:           sub    $0x78, %esp
                                   .
                                   .  
                                   .
0x0804851f:           ret 
main():
func():
0x080486f1: int 0x80
0x084753e popa
0x084753f jmp  [eax+0xe3]
                                       .
                                       .
0x084753e add    %edx, %eax
0x0847541 jmp  %ecx
                                       .
                                       .
0x08476e3 int 0x80
gadget1:
gadget2:
gadget3:
 
a) An example to resist ROP attacks.    b)  An example to resist JOP attacks. 
Fig. 7. Examples to resist CRAs. a) An example to resist ROP attacks. b)
An example to resist JOP attacks.
call instruction is fetched, jump to the step 6) to perform;
when the ret instruction is fetched, jump to the step 9) to
perform; when the jmp instruction is fetched, jump to the
step 13) to perform; if the program is done, exit normally.
6) Transmit the return address of the call instruction to XOR
unit.
7) XOR unit performs XOR operation on return address
with key length 2 and key 2, and sends the result to
EHDCC.
8) EHDCC calculates the encrypted hamming distance be-
tween the current return address and key 2 according
to the received result. Then the encrypted Hamming
distance is pushed into the stack as a parameter of the
call instruction, following the return address. Jump to the
step 13) to perform.
9) Transmit the return address of the ret instruction to XOR
unit.
10) XOR unit performs XOR operation on the return address
with key length 2 and key 2, and sends the result to
EHDCC.
11) EHDCC calculates the EHD between the current return
address and key 2 according to the received result and
sends the encrypted Hamming distance to DC.
12) DC unit receives the EHD from EHDCC and compares it
with pre-stored EHD. If the comparing result is the same,
program continues to perform, and jump to the step 5);
if not, jump to the step 16).
13) Program jumps to target address of the call or jmp
instruction. When the instruction at target address is
loaded in CPU, the content of IR register is transmitted
to XOR unit.
14) XOR unit performs XOR operation toward the instruction
with key length 1 and key 1 for linear decryption and
returns the result to IR register of CPU.
15) CPU executes the instruction which has been decrypted
within IR register. If the decrypted instruction is exe-
cuted normally, jumps to 5); if not, the program exits
abnormally.
16) The attack is detected; system produces warning and
waits to be processed.
In what follows, we use a 32-bit CISC instruction archi-
tecture to illustrate the key idea of our approach. In this
case, a n-bit PUF is used to encode n-bit instructions at the
target address of the call and jmp instructions and compute
the EHD. We give two examples to demonstrate how code-
reuse attacks would fail in attacking programs protected by the
HCIC. As an example, as shown in Fig. 7a), a call instruction
diverts execution to the entry point of a function func().
Assume the return address A1 is 0x0804854b and key 2 is
0xa2156cf7. The HD between A1 and key 2 is 16 (010000).
‘01000010’ is generated by padding the first 2-bit ‘10’ of
key 2 to ‘010000’. Then ‘01000010’ is rotated right 7 bits
(because the last 3-bit ‘111’ of key 2 is equal to 7) to get the
encrypted Hamming distance EHD1 132 (10000100) which
is pushed into the stack. If an attacker has overflowed the
return address in order to perform the instruction “int 0x80”
at the address A2 (0x080486f1), the overflowed address A2
will be fetched when ret is executed. However, the encrypted
Hamming distance EHD2 between A2 and key 2 is computed
with XOR and EHDCC. DC determines whether EHD1 is
equal to EHD2. Because the attacker does not know the PUF
key, EHD1 (132) is not equal to EHD2 (108). In this case, the
program would throw an exception and generate a warning.
Hence, the program will not perform the intended instruction
“int 0x80”.
As another example, as shown in Fig. 7b), we assume an
attacker overflows the program successfully to perform JOP
attacks. When the jmp in gadget1 is executed, the program
would be deviated to the gadget2. However, the XOR would
be used to decrypt the target instruction “add %edx, %eax”.
The decryption would be wrong for the target instruction
because this unintended instruction did not be encoded by
XOR operation. Hence, our proposed HCIC can efficiently
thwart the code reuse attacks.
C. Exception Analysis
In complex binaries, there are some exceptions to the
normal behavior of call, ret, and jmp instructions. For example,
most of the previously proposed CFI methods that strictly
follow call-ret pairing would result in false positives even
for the normal control flow of the program when call-ret
pair is replaced by call-jmp pair. In this section, we will
discuss exceptional cases in detail, and prove that our proposed
defense does not produce these anomalies.
Case 1: the jmp instruction replaces the ret instruction to
target the return address.
There are two cases that the jmp instruction will replace the
ret instruction to target the return address: 1) the longjmp()
function in the C language. After longjmp() function is
executed, the indirect jmp instruction targets the return address
instead of the ret instruction; 2) the compiler sometimes
replaces ret instructions with the pop and jmp instructions.
In these cases, a CFI policy which strictly follows call-ret
pairing would result in false positives.
HCIC does not result in false positives in these cases.
When the call instruction is executed, the return address of
the function is pushed into the stack with the EHD. When
the function is done, the jmp instruction instead of the ret
instruction will be executed to target the return address. In
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addition, the first instruction at the target address of the jmp
instruction has been encrypted before the program is loaded
into memory. Therefore, when the jmp instruction instead of
the ret instruction is executed, the program will decrypt and
execute the first instruction at the target address successfully.
The stack space of the function will be reclaimed after the
function is done.
Case 2: call-ret instructions appear in different order
For the shadow stack technique, all threads share the same
shadow stack. In a multithreaded program, thread A executes
the call instruction, and the return address R1 is pushed into
the shadow stack. Then thread B executes the call instruction,
and the return address R2 is pushed into the shadow stack suc-
cessively. In this case, if thread A executes the ret instruction
before B, R1 will be popped to compare with the R2 at the
top of the shadow stack, which would throw an exception due
to the mismatch. In order to handle this exception, the return
address is allowed to match all addresses in the shadow stack,
which increases the performance overhead greatly.
In our proposed method, the exception does not be produced
in the multi-threaded program because all call functions have
their own stack and the EHDs between the PUF key and their
return addresses are stored in the stack without affecting each
other.
Case 3: ret instruction returns to a non-return address
In the C++ exception handling mechanism, an exception
is thrown when the program executes the throw() function.
After the throw() is done, the program will jump directly with
the ret instruction to the end of the try block instead of the
next instruction after the throw(). In this case, some defenses
[46] will produce an exception since the return address is not
the return address stored in the shadow stack when the call
instruction is executed. In order to handle the exceptional case,
[46] extended rules by adding the exception handler landing
pad addresses in the .eh frame and .gcc except table to the
shadow stack so that the return address of the ret instruction
in throw() can be matched in the shadow stack. However, in
our experiments, we found that the throw() function eventually
jumps to the end of the try block by the jmp instruction instead
of the ret instruction.
HCIC does not produce the exception. Similar to the case
1, when throw() function is executed, the return address of
the function is pushed into the stack with the EHD. When the
throw() function is done, the jmp instruction is executed to
target the end of the try block. In HCIC, the first instruction
at the target address of the jmp instruction has been encrypted
before the program is loaded into memory. When the jmp in-
struction is executed, the program will decrypt and execute the
first instruction at the target address successfully. Therefore,
the throw() function can be executed normally with the jmp
instruction. The stack space of the function will be reclaimed
after the function is done.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
For code reuse attacks, attackers first make use of the
stack overflow to overwrite the return address to execute the
first gadget, and then the ret/jmp/call instructions of gadgets
are used to change the control flow between gadgets, which
finally enables the attackers to execute malicious actions. Stack
smashing and ROP attacks are based on overwriting of the
return address. Our technique secures the target address of
the ret instruction by the EHDME and EHDMD operations.
Therefore, these attacks can be prevented. JOP attacks use the
target address of the indirect jmp and call instruction which is
limited to point to the first instructions of BBs. Since a part
of first instructions of BBs have been encoded by the PUFE
operation before the executable binary is loaded into memory,
if any call and jmp instructions illegally change the control
flow to the instruction which is not the first instruction of the
BBs, the instruction would be wrongly decoded by the PUFD
operation. With the PUF key updating, even the illegal control
flow between BBs can be prevented. Thus, all the common
attacks to the control flow can be prevented by our method.
In what follows, the four important security threats or metrics
are analyzed.
A. The key leakage issue
In [18], the simple XOR operation is used to encrypt the
return address in the stack and the instructions at the target
addresses of the indirect jmp instructions. This scheme suffers
the following key leakage issues:
1) Attackers can get the original and encrypted return
address by debugging and then deduce the secret key
through the XOR operation.
2) Attackers can get the original and encrypted instruction
by debugging and then deduce the secret key through the
XOR operation.
HCIC is to calculate and compare the EHD between the
return address and the secret key to resist the ROP attack,
and decrypt the instruction at the target address of jmp and
call instructions to resist the JOP attack. Although the return
address and the EHD between the return address and the secret
PUF key are pushed into the stack, the attacker cannot deduce
the key with the EHD and the address. Therefore, HCIC
resolves the above key leakage issue and hence exhibits the
higher security.
In addition, HCIC uses two registers KEY 1 and KEY 2
to store different PUF keys against JOP and ROP, respectively,
which further improves the security. If the EHD calculation
and the instruction encryption use the same key, attackers can
get the key key 1 used for JOP defense by debugging, and
then use key 1 to crack the ROP defense. With different PUF
keys for EHD calculation and instruction encryption, even
if the attacker can obtain the key 1 in the JOP defense by
debugging, key 1 cannot be used for ROP attacks. Moreover,
the key 1 cannot be used to launch JOP attacks anymore be-
cause HCIC will encrypt the instructions before the program is
loaded into memory and decrypt the instructions dynamically
when the program is running (It is well-known that if the
program has been loaded into memory, the code can not be
tampered anymore). Therefore, HCIC does not suffer the key
leakage issues.
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B. EHD guessing attacks
In our proposed ROP defense, if attackers guess the cor-
rect encrypted Hamming distance (EHD) between the return
address and the secret PUF key key 2, the defense would
be compromised. In this paper, we assume that an attacker is
able to obtain the EHD between the return address and key 2
through debugging and also can find available gadgets in the
program. In what follows, we will evaluate the probability that
the attacker launches an ROP attack.
Assume that the attacker gets the return address Ri and the
EHDi between Ri and the key 2, and can find a gadgetj
whose address Rj has x-bit difference with Ri. If the attacker
wants to jump to the gadgetj , he/she must first guess m and
then guess the EHDj between Rj and key 2. Since m is set
to be the last k-bit in the key 2 in this paper, and m ranges
from 0 to 2k − 1, the probability that m is guessed correctly
is ( 12 )
k.
If x is odd, HDj has x+1 possible values (HDi ± 1, HDi
± 3, HDi ± 5, ..., HDi ± x); If x is even, HDj has x+ 1
possible values (HDi ± 0, HDi ± 2, HDi ± 4, ..., HDi
± x). Therefore, the probability that the attacker guesses the
correct HDj between Rj and key 2 is 1x+1 .
After correctly guessing m and getting the correct HDi, the
attacker can guess the EHDj . The probability that the attacker
guesses the correct EHDj between Rj and key 2 would be
( 12 )
k * 1x+1 , and finally, the probability that the attacker could
successfully perform an ROP attack is
P = [(
1
2
)k ∗ ( 1
x+ 1
)]
n
(2)
where n denotes the number of gadgets in an ROP gadgets
chain.
Take an extreme case that x is equal to 1 for example. The
probability that attackers guess the correct m is ( 12 )
k, and the
probability that attackers guess the correct HDj between Rj
and key 2 is 12 . Hence, the probability that attackers guess the
correct EHDj between Rj and key 2 would be ( 12 )
k+1. In
such worst and extreme case, the probability that an attacker
could successfully perform an ROP attack is ( 12 )
n∗(k+1). It is
difficult to launch an attack when n ∗ (k + 1) is greater than
32.
C. Advanced CRAs
As an advanced CRA, the full-function reuse attack can
utilize full functions as gadgets to implement attacks. Since
there are many indirect call/jmp instructions existing in a
program, attackers may use them to conduct the full-function
CRA. For example, RIPE [49] contains 80 attacks that use
indirect call instructions. If an attacker uses indirect call/jmp
instructions to conduct thus advanced CRAs, most current
defenses such as ASLR [25]–[27], shadow stack [28]–[30],
gadgets checking [32] and CFI [17], [18], [46] would be
bypassed. For example, shadow stack techniques [46] allow the
return address to be any address in the shadow stack to avoid
an exception thrown in the case of multithread and longjmp(),
so it is vulnerable to return-based full-function CRAs.
?
Algorithm: key-updating 
 
1 Input: 32-bit key_2, return address and count 
2 Output: EHD and the updated key_2 
3 Initialize: l and m                                                              
4 if the instruction is a indirect call then 
5     count=count+1 
6     for n=0, 1, …, 31 do 
7         hd [n] = key_2 [n] ? address[n]?  
8     end for 
9     insert l at the end of the hd 
10     EHD=rotate hd right m bits?
11 else if the instruction is a return then 
12     count=count-1 
13     for n=0, 1, …, 31 do 
14         hd [n] = key_2 [n] ? address[n]?  
15     end for 
16     insert l at the end of the hd 
17     EHD=rotate hd right m bits 
18     if count == 0 then 
19         Update the key_2 
20     end if 
21 end if 
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It is possible for attackers to bypass our ROP defense
with the return-based full-function reuse. First, in the attack
preparation phase, attackers traverse the program to find out
all the available full-functions as gadgets. Then, they record
these full-functions’ return addresses and the corresponding
EHDs when the program is running. Finally, attackers replace
the return address and EHD in the stack with one of recorded
available full-functions’ return addresses and the correspond-
ing EHD to hijack the control flow. This advanced CRAs can
be prevented with our proposed key-updating method which
can invalidate previous recorded addresses and EHDs.
The key-updating algorithm is shown above. The inputs to
the algorithm are 32-bit PUF key key 2, return address and
the count of counter. Count is initialized to 0 when the key
is generated. The outputs of the algorithm are the encrypted
Hamming distance (See Section V.A) and the updated key.
At the beginning of the algorithm, l is initialized to the first
l-bit of key 2, and m is initialized to the last k bits of
key 2. A counter is used to record the number of times of
the key 2 used. When the call instruction is executed, the
counter is increased by 1; when the ret instruction is executed,
the counter is decreased by 1. When the counter is reduced to
0, the key will be updated immediately.
However, our defense mechanism is vulnerable to a more
advanced CRA, COOP [47]. As a new emerged full-function
reuse attack in C ++ applications, COOP uses virtual functions
as gadgets and does not need to modify the function’s return
address so that HCIC is unable to detect such attack. We
therefore assume auxiliary protections for virtual calls. For
example, we assume that VTrust is deployed with about addi-
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tional 0.72% performance overhead [55]. In other words, we
assume virtual function calls are well-protected. In addition,
non-control data attacks [56] [48] tamper with or leak security
sensitive memory, which is not directly used in control transfer
instructions. Therefore, our approach, as well as all other
control flow integrity methods, cannot prevent non-control
data attacks. Usually, memory safety enforcement needs to
be deployed to prevent the non-control-data attacks. However,
the deployment of current memory safety proposals incurs
high performance overhead. Development of practical memory
safety defense is an active research area, which are out of the
scope of this paper.
D. Side channel attacks
Side channel attack is to statistically analyze the electro-
magnetic emanation, power consumption or time of the cryp-
tographic devices to gain knowledge about integrated secrets
[19]. It is well-known that any key-based security mechanisms
would be vulnerable to side channel attacks unless appropriate
countermeasures are taken. In this paper, since the PUF key
can be dynamically updated, our proposed HCIC mechanism
would be less vulnerable to side channel attacks than tra-
ditional cryptographic keys which rely on permanent secure
storage. However, our approach is not completely side channel
attack free. In future, we plan to conduct the experiments on
FPGAs to evaluate the resiliency of this technique to side
channel attacks in detail.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The SPEC CPU2006 [50], BioBench [51], MiBench [52]
and Stream benchmarks [53] are used in our experiment. These
benchmarks are compiled using the GNU GCC version 4.9.2
at O3 optimization level on Ubuntu-15.04. Pin [54] is used
to get the target addresses of jmp and call instructions and
the instructions at the target addresses for pre-processing of
benchmarks. We use RIPE [49], which contains 850 buffer
overflow attacks, to evaluate the defense capability of our
proposed mechanism.
TABLE I
ROP GADGETS REDUCTION TESTED BY ROPGADGET-V5.4
Benchmark TotalGadgets
Allowed
Gadgets
ROP Gadgets
Elimination rate
mcf 11927 0 100%
hmmer 15802 0 100%
libquantum 12531 0 100%
h264ref 17820 0 100%
lbm 12304 0 100%
blowfish 12140 0 100%
phylip 13466 0 100%
specrand 11591 0 100%
stream 11549 0 100%
basicmath 14664 0 100%
patricia 13188 0 100%
sha 13304 0 100%
Average 100%
A. Evaluation on RIPE Benchmark Attacks
RIPE consists of 850 buffer-overflow attacks which can
bypass ASLR and perform code injection, return-into-libc, and
ROP on the stack, heap, BSS, and data segment. Our test
results show that in the case of disabling DEP, 419 attacks
out of 850 attacks in RIPE can be successful. Among the
419 attacks, 339 of them tamper the return addresses of ret
instructions, such as code injection, return-into-libc, and ROP.
Since our defense mechanism limits the return address to be
the address of the next instruction of the corresponding call
instruction by computing and matching EHD, these attacks get
detected.
B. Gadgets Reduction
We use the gadgets reduction as a metric to evaluate our
defense mechanism. In general, attackers use the gadgets to
perform CRAs, so the allowed gadgets reduction is one of
the important metrics to evaluate a defense mechanism. For
example, the average gadgets reduction for a previous work
[46] is 99.381%. The reason of the allowed gadgets still
existing in this defense mechanism is that there are some
BBs can be exploited to perform an ROP. HCIC limits the
return address to be the address of the next instruction of the
corresponding call instruction, so the attacker is difficult to
use BBs to perform ROP attacks. We use ROPGadget-v5.4
[5] to scan the binary to get all ROP gadgets in the program
and get the number of allowed ROP gadgets which are used
to bypass the defense mechanism and perform ROP attacks.
Table I gives the number of ROP gadgets, allowed gadgets
and the gadgets reduction rate for different benchmarks with
HCIC. The test results show that HCIC can effectively reduce
the allowed gadgets (the allowed gadgets are 0 and the gadgets
reduction rate achieves 100%).
C. Average Indirect Target Reduction (AIR)
In general, attackers hijack the normal control flow of the
program and perform CRAs by tampering the target addresses
of control flow instructions. Therefore, reducing the number
of indirect targets can reduce the successful probability that
attackers conduct CRAs. So, the reduction of indirect targets is
one of the important metrics to evaluate a defense mechanism.
The average indirect target reduction (AIR) metric [12] is used
to evaluate the reduction of indirect targets, as Eq. (3) shows.
AIR = 1/n
n∑
j=1
(1− |Tj |/S) (3)
where, n denotes the number of control flow instructions, Tj
denotes the number of indirect target addresses, S denotes the
size of binary code.
In HCIC, all call instructions target the beginning of func-
tions, all jmp instructions target the starting address of BBs,
and all ret instructions target the next instructions of the
corresponding call instructions. Hence, the number of target
addresses for call instructions is given by the number of func-
tions, and the number of target addresses for jmp instructions
is given by the number of BBs. For the ret instructions, the
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number of target addresses is always 1. Then Eq. (3) can be
simplified to Eq. (4).
AIR = 1− (|Tcall|+ |Tjmp|+ 1)/3S (4)
where, Tcall is the number of functions and the Tjmp is
the number of BBs. Fig. 8 shows the estimation of AIR on
benchmarks with HCIC. The reduction of indirect targets is
greater than 99.8%, which means that HCIC can eliminate
almost all indirect targets.
D. False positive/negative
Typical CFI implementations require a precise CFG of the
program. However, the generation of precise CFGs for real-
word software remains an open research problem. Therefore,
all CFI-based defenses that require the precise CFG may
generate false positive. The CFG includes basic blocks (BB)
information and the execution flow between BBs. Our ap-
proach only needs BBs information in CFG, which eliminates
the need of source code analysis and static analysis. If the
legal target addresses of some call or jmp instructions are
not covered by the profiled CFG, HCIC would produce false
positives when the program decrypts unencrypted instructions
at those addresses. The false-positive can be reduced with a
CFG as precise as possible. In order to get a CFG as precisely
as possible, during profiling, to increase the coverage, we
run each benchmark thousands of times with different set of
valid inputs to get the possible target addresses of all the jmp
and call instructions. On the other hand, if attackers can use
full-functions as gadgets to launch advanced CRAs, the false-
negative will occur. However, most of advanced CRAs can be
detected with HCIC. Therefore, in theory, the false negative
rate would be extremely low.
Several tools have been developed to extract the BB in-
formation from a program such as Pin and Valgrind. In
our experiments, we first use Pin to collect all destination
addresses of call and jmp instructions before the program is
loaded into memory. Then, we encode the first instruction
with the XOR operation at the target address of call and
jmp instructions to prevent JOP. The experimental results
show that the false positive is 0% with HCIC. Besides, we
evaluated the false negative by analyzing gadgets and indirect
targets reduction. Our experimental results show that HCIC
TABLE II
RUNTIME OVERHEAD
Benchmark Originalruntime(s)
Result
runtime(s)
Runtime
overhead
mcf 2.652508 2.684364 1.2%
hmmer 0.003413 0.003450 1.08%
libquantum 0.004010 0.004041 0.77%
h264ref 29.620388 30.010754 1.31%
lbm 2.753622 2.763091 0.34%
blowfish 0.000741 0.000752 1.5%
phylip 0.002136 0.002159 1.1%
specrand 0.023326 0.023489 0.7%
stream 1.105379 1.111355 0.54%
basicmath 0.284601 0.284694 0.03%
patricia 0.076869 0.077837 1.25%
sha 0.037029 0.037612 1.57%
Average 0.95%
TABLE III
BINARY SIZE OVERHEAD
Benchmark OriginalSize(B)
Result
Size(B)
Binary Size
overhead
mcf 761244 767145 0.7753%
hmmer 1119396 1130997 1.0364%
libquantum 853244 859221 0.7005%
h264ref 780604 781334 0.0935%
lbm 781872 786030 0.5318%
blowfish 764524 767004 0.3244%
phylip 858452 864139 0.6625%
specrand 743580 748150 0.6147%
stream 752128 758546 0.8534%
basicmath 803960 812411 1.0512%
patricia 748032 756532 1.1363%
sha 747808 759476 1.5603%
Average 0.7783%
can reduce the ROP gadgets and indirect targets by 100% and
99.8%, respectively.
E. Performance and Binary Size Overhead
HCIC computes and matches the EHD, and decrypts the
instructions at the target addresses of the call and jmp in-
structions when the program is running, which would generate
the runtime overhead. In our experiments, we insert an “andl
%eax, %eax” instruction in the beginning and ending of each
function, and insert an “andl %eax, %eax” instruction before
each call and jmp instruction. The reason for inserting the
“andl %eax, %eax” instruction is that this instruction will
not modify the value of the register and the program can be
executed normally. As shown in Table II, the average runtime
overhead is 0.95%, which is far less than the performance
overhead of traditional CFIs.
Because the sequential execution of encrypted instructions
will produce the false positive (i.e., the first loop of the
do-while statement), we insert a jmp instruction before the
instruction at the destination address of a jmp instruction to
ensure that the program can run normally. The destination
address of the inserted jmp instruction is the next encrypted
instruction’s address. We just insert one instruction before the
instruction at the destination address of the jmp instruction.
Therefore, HCIC produces very low binary size overhead. As
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shown in Table III, the average binary size overhead is just
0.78%.
F. Comparison of Security and Practicality
We compare HCIC with recent methods [33] [36] [37] [18]
[15] [17] [55]. Security and practicality are two most important
metrics to evaluate current CRA defenses. Practicality is eval-
uated by ISA extensions, compiler modification, binary size
increasement and performance overhead. Security is evaluated
by the key leakage and security level. We divide the security
level of defense mechanisms into the following four levels:
• Level-I: Only defend against ROP;
• Level-II: defend against ROP and JOP;
• Level-III: defend against ROP, JOP and some advanced
CRAs such as COOP;
• Level-IV: defend against all potential CRAs.
As shown in Table IV, HCIC incurs low performance and
binary overheads, and does not need to extend ISAs and
modify compilers. Besides, HCIC can achieve the level-II
without leaking the key. It is worth noting that HCIC can be
enriched with VTrust [55] (VTrust protects virtual call only
and is unable to prevent against ROP and JOP) to defend
against COOP with additional 0.72% performance overhead.
Obviously, our proposed HCIC shows the best balance be-
tween security and practicality.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a hardware-assisted CFI checking
technique to resolve the vulnerabilities that current software-
based CFI incurs high performance overhead and hardware-
based may require extending the existing processors’ ISAs
or suffer some security vulnerabilities. The key technique
involves two control flow verification mechanisms. The first
one is to compute EHDs between the PUF response and the
return addresses, then verifies whether the EHDs are matched
to make attackers impossible to return between gadgets, thus
resisting ROP attacks. The second one is to perform the linear
XOR operation between the PUF key and the instructions
at target addresses of call and jmp instructions once the
executable binary is loaded into memory, then the runtime
linear decryption operation can be done when jmp and call
instructions are executed, thus defeating JOP attacks. The
experiment results show that the proposed new technique
incurs extremely low performance overhead (average 0.95%)
and binary size overhead (average 0.78%), which are much
lower than traditional CFI approaches. Exception analysis
shows that our proposed defense does not produce anomalies
when some exceptional cases occurred. Security analysis also
shows that the proposed method is sound and secure against
code reuse attacks with zero false positive and negative rates.
Coarse-grained CFI is more vulnerable to function reuse
attacks than fine-grained CFI which validates call sites beyond
just the target address considering elements such as expected
VTable type, validating number of arguments, or even argu-
ment types, for a given indirect call. A key tradeoff between
the two approaches is performance, as introducing too much
complexity into a CFI policy can add significant overhead.
Considering this, current deployed CFI schemes in industry
are almost coarse-grained CFI such as Microsoft’s Control
Flow Guard and Intel’s Control-flow Enforcement Technology.
HCIC is able to prevent ROP, JOP and return-based full-
function reuse attacks, and can be enriched with auxiliary
protections to prevent virtual function reuse with additional
small performance penalty. Our proposed method shows a
good balance between security and practicality.
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